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Since all decisions involve some element of risk, stress has critical impact on decision
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and, hence, impacting decision quality. Empirical testing of a component of this framework
provided interesting preliminary results. Subjects experiencing high stress indicated the same
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ABSTRACT
Studies of human decision making have demonstrated that stress exacerbates risk taking. Since
all decisions involve some element of risk, stress has critical impact on decision quality.
Decisions are found to improve with stress up to an optimal threshold beyond which
deterioration is observed. However, few studies have examined the psychological experiences
underlying risk-taking behavior in conjunction with stress creators. In this paper we propose a
research framework that integrates pre-conditions of stress (perceptions of high gain/loss, risk,
complexity, and organizational pressure) with observed psychological experiences (time
pressure, uncertainty, information overload, and dynamism) that potentially result in risky
decision making. This framework suggests that decision support systems have the potential of
mitigating or enhancing the psychological perceptions of stress and, hence, impacting decision
quality. Empirical testing of a component of this framework provided interesting preliminary
results. Subjects experiencing high stress indicated the same levels of perceived uncertainty and
dynamism as subjects exposed to low stress, suggesting that use of a decision support system
mitigated the perceptions of dynamism and uncertainty for the high stress group. Contrary to
hypotheses, the use of a decision support system did not mitigate perceptions of information
overload.
Keywords: decision making under stress, decision support system, information overload, time
pressure, decision quality, stress, Yerkes Dodson Law
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
Cognitive science has recognized that “psychological stress exceeding a certain intensity
affects the quality of decision making” (Keinan, 1987). Proposed aids to decision making under
stress (DMUS) have varied with significant emphasis being placed on use of decision support
systems (DSS) (Smith, Arnold and Sutton, 1997; Smith, Johnston and Paris, 2004; Sarter and
Schroeder, 2001). Although studies have been completed in specific domain areas, the rich and
varied theoretical viewpoints emerging from psychology, information systems, and
organizational behavior have led to mixed results. Many of these studies concluded that decision
making under extremely stressful conditions such as emergency response can only be studied
within the specific application domain of interest (Hutchins, 1996) relying on previous training
(Klein, 1989; Kowalski-Trakofler, Vaught and Scharf, 2003) and preparatory information
(Inzana et al., 1996). Researchers argued that decision aiding in such situations had to be
tailored to the specific decision and user group (Klein et al., 1993). Under the more normal
conditions encountered in business and managerial situations, decision making has been studied
more generally in terms of stressors such as time pressure and information overload (Smith,
Arnold and Sutton, 1997; Maule, Hockey and Bdzola, 2000; Marsden, Pakath and Wibowo,
2002; Aminilari and Pakath, 2005). Studies have shown that DSS can assist the user in these
situations and improve decision quality. Although some researchers have suggested that “the
value of a computer-based decision aid may be most apparent under higher stress conditions”
(Grabowski and Sanborn, 2001, p.114), few have conducted an in-depth assessment of decision
quality and specific psychological experiences using a DSS under stressful compared to low
stress conditions.
In this paper we propose an integrative framework for DMUS that associates preconditions of stress (perceptions of high gain/loss, risk, complexity, and organizational pressure)
with psychological experiences (time pressure, uncertainty, information overload, and
dynamism) that result in potentially risky decisions. The framework relies on the vast body of
prior empirical literature to suggest a mitigative role for DSS on psychological perceptions of
stress and, thereby, decision performance. We conduct an exploratory investigation of this
model with a group of 89 decision makers.
The next section provides an overview of the literature associated with decision making
under stress and examines preconditions and manifestation of stress in decision making. An
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integrating model based on the literature is proposed in Section 3.0 to explain the mitigating
effect of DSS. The experimental study is then described in Section 4.0, and data are presented
together with analyses. Results are discussed in Section 5.0, and the paper concludes with a
summary and contributions to the literature.

2.0 BACKGROUND
2.1 Stress and Decision Making
Cognitive resource theory (Vecchio, 1990) confirms that stress can negatively impact
intelligence and decision quality. Harassed decision-makers often make riskier decisions (Lehner
et al., 1997). Baradell and Klein (1993) reported that stress, perceived as time pressure, low selfesteem, and threats of punishment for poor performance, resulted in more errors on cognitive
tasks, use of stereotypes when making judgments, and a greater tendency to ignore situational
norms in reaching decisions. In group settings, Smith, Arnott, and Sutton (1997) found that the
quality of group decisions declines under conditions of stress. Stressed decision makers usually
demonstrate impaired performance (Ahituv, Igbaria and Sella, 1998) and generate fewer
alternatives in the decision process because these alternatives appear less attractive under
conditions of stress (Mann and Tan, 1993; Svenson, Edland and Karlsson, 1985). In sum,
numerous studies have confirmed deleterious effect of stress on decision quality.
Diverse explanations have been proposed for demonstration of deleterious behavior under
stress. Decision makers seek rational solutions which may not be accessible under the
circumstances (Fiedler, 1986). They ignore crucial information, use simplifying and often
inefficient strategies (Lehner et al., 1997; Svenson and Edland, 1987), and become extremely
alert to discrediting evidence (Wright, 1974). Janis (1993) proposed decision conflict theory as a
coping behavior that decision makers use to respond to stress by becoming hyper vigilant in their
search for information. In this state they frantically search for a solution, fail to consider all
alternatives, process information in a disorganized manner, and rapidly shift among possible
solutions. Furthermore, stress can interfere with a fair evaluation of appropriateness of responses
(Baumann, Sniezek and Buerkle, 2001). Typifying recency and availability bias ( Tversky and
Kahneman, 1974), under stressful conditions decision makers can revert to familiar responses
from prior experiences which may be inadequate for the challenging situation at hand (Kaemph
et al., 1996).Since rationality is bound by ability of the human mind to process complex
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information (Simon, 1997), demands of stressful conditions are often beyond the capabilities of
human short term memory (Smith, Johnston and Paris, 2004). Physiological explanations (de
Quervain et al. 2000) suggest that stress can cause the release of steroids that can interfere with
short term memory. Under such circumstances, decisions are more likely to be faulty than
decisions resulting from rational, organized decision making.
Much research effort in DMUS has focused on decision making under extreme
emergency situations as those experienced by emergency personnel. Such studies exist in the
area of emergency management (Kowalski, 1995), air and military warfare (Morrison et al.,
1997; Angelborg-Thanderz, 1997; Hutchins, 1996), commercial aviation (Poulton, 1976), and
nuclear emergencies (Papamichail and French, 2005). Managerial DMUS has focused largely on
the impact of stress induced by time pressure with significant focus in the auditing and
accounting areas (Smith et al., 1997; Arnold et al., 1998; Sutton et al., 1998; Arnold et al.,
2000). Our work falls within this domain of management decision making.

2.2 Pre-conditions to and Psychological Manifestation of Stress
What causes stress i.e. what are its pre-conditions? While much has been written in the
context of job and organizational stress, for purposes of this paper, we examine stress as
experienced in individual decision settings, with the acknowledgement that general work stress
can impact the decision maker’s response to individual settings. In this narrower domain, we
found four key factors that led to stressful decision situations. First, perceptions of high gain or
loss in the decision can result in increased stress while taking that decision (Frisch and Clemen,
1994). When combined with the riskiness of outcome (a probability measure), high gain/loss can
enhance the perception of stress. Third, when the decision environment is complex and highly
unstructured, individuals can feel increased stress (Johnston, Driskell and Salas, 1997; Hollnagel,
1987, 1993) since there are fewer past experiences to revert to. Finally, as there is increased
organizational/internal pressure to achieve success from this decision (Kirby and Davis, 1998),
individuals may encounter greater perceptions of stress. Although on some scale, most semistructured decisions would qualify as stressful decisions, we do emphasize that the intensity of
these conditions will be higher in order to create stress (Keinan, 1987).
Under conditions described above, the decision-maker will undergo several negative
psychological experiences that can impact decision quality. These perceptions of negative
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experiences have been termed more broadly as stress. In current literature, stress has been
measured as perceptions of increased time pressure (Smith, Arnold and Sutton, 1997; Arnold et
al., 1998; Sutton et al., 1998; Arnold et al., 2000), perceptions of increased information overload
(Smith et al., 1997; Marsden et al., 2002), increased perceived dynamism of the decision
situation, and increased uncertainty in the decision environment(Field et al., 2006).
A common trigger for stress is perception of increased time pressure. Although this
perception can positively impact the focus required for task completion (Karau and Kelly, 1992),
it is most often associated with reduced decision quality (Hwang and Lin, 1999; Kelly and
McGrath, 1985; Karau and Kelly, 1992; Stokes and Raby, 1989).
Stress measured as information overload is also found to be detrimental to decision
quality (Smith et al. (1997), Marsden et al. (2002), Hahn et al. (1992). Information overload is
exhibited when the decision maker is receiving more information than he/she can process for
effective decision making. Often this decline in decision quality is evidenced by inconsistent
decision-making, disagreement with composite judgment, and lower consensus (Chewning and
Harrel, 1990). Lamb (1991) indicates that information processing capability is limited in
humans and animals and when the level of information exceeds that capacity selective attention
is used to process some information at the expense of other information. Vugdelija and Aguirre
(2004) point out that information overload has a paralyzing effect in crisis situations, and it
becomes increasingly difficult to distinguish vital information from secondary information.
Other studies such as those by Schultze and Vandenbosch (1998), Chewning and Harrel (1990),
and Kim (1998) have also examined the impact of information overload on decision quality,
though not necessarily under conditions of stress.
Stressful decision situations increase in intensity as the element of dynamism, such as
constantly changing criteria or environment for the decision, is introduced. The decision
environment becomes particularly intense when the decision maker has to make rapid,
independent decisions under changing conditions such as those associated with threat assessment
(Phillips-Wren and Forgionne, 2002). In Kersthot(1994), subjects were required to monitor an
athlete running a race and determine if the athlete needed treatment to restore her fitness level.
Subjects tended to use a judgmental approach even though an action-oriented strategy would
have given the best return. They waited longer to intervene when the probability of false alarms
increased, but maintained the same intervention level across time pressure conditions. Waiting
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longer to take action under conditions of uncertainty has been called ‘action-postponement’ and
explained as thinking that a decision maker can postpone action until after nature moves
(Pomerol, 2001). Executive decisions are inherently dynamic since decision makers need more
than minimal information, layered advice, fast conflict resolution, and integration between
decisions and tactical plans to make rapid decisions (Eisenhardt, 1989).
Uncertainty, the lack of complete knowledge about a situation, is known to negatively
impact a decision maker’s ability to process data and information in a decision situation (Simon
1980, Nutt, 1990; Landsbergen et al., 1997). It creates fear and/or indecisiveness (Covey, Merrill
and Merrill, 1994) and causes bias that interferes with rational decision making (Hey, 1993).
Mahan et al. (1999) suggested that when faced with irreducible levels of uncertainty, decision
makers often use expert judgment, and that decision support can drive the decision maker toward
a particular type of cognition. Field et al. (2006) found that uncertainty reduction strategies were
associated with improved performance. Hey, Loloto and Maffioletti (2008) found that subjects
simplify in uncertain situations instead of using more sophisticated decision rules.
Business and emergency decisions share similar preconditions, although at varying
levels. We suggest that stressful managerial decision environments require at least one of four
pre-conditions: (1) a situation of high/gain or loss; (2) a risky outcome; (3) a complex decision
environment; and, (4) organizational pressure to minimize the negatives of a decision. These
preconditions then result in a manifestation of stress, often represented as (1) time pressure; (2)
information overload; (3) uncertainty of decision parameters; and/or (4) perception of dynamic
decision environment.

2.3 Decision Support for Decision Making
Several studies have provided evidence toward the positive role of DSS on improved
decision quality. For instance, Haubl and Trifts (2000) found that online buyers make more
efficient and better quality decisions when interactive decision aids are provided to them in early
phases of their decision process. Benbasat, Dexter and Todd (1986) investigated the influence of
different information representations, color, and information presentation on user perceptions
and decision performance under varying time constraints. Color led to improvements in decision
making under time pressure. Zeleznikow and Nolan (2001) found that soft computing methods
could be integrated with statistical methods, reasoning from imprecise data, and knowledge
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discovery from databases to provide effective decision support in uncertain environments.
Vugdelija and Aguirre (2004) developed an expert system for a power plant to analyze incoming
information in real-time and verbally announce recommendations for operation. Such organized
information feeds resulted in quick response time, identification of relevant information,
emotionless reasoning, enhanced knowledge, and expert advice. Similarly, Lee (2004) proposed
a multi-agent system to deal with information overload in electronic commerce and Turetken and
Sharda (2004) utilized fisheye-based clustering and visualization to mitigate adverse effects of
information overload from Web searches. Recently, Aminilari and Pakath (2005) examined the
effectiveness of written text and images on decision makers under time pressured financial
situations. Image users earned more in this simulation but utilized less accurate search strategies
as compared to text users.Multimedia (Metha, Webb and Bitter1995), volumetric displays using
laser technologies to view 3D images (Wild and Griggs, 1998), and decision-centered screen
displays (Thordsen, 1998) have all been proposed as improved decision support solutions.
Despite these initiatives, the use of decision aids has largely focused on system design
and human-computer interaction issues. Furthermore, results on the beneficial use of decision
technologies have been equivocal. Other studies we encountered, such as that by Akbari and
Menhaj (2000), focused largely on design of decision aids and overlooked performance
degrading issues such as stress and workload. Furthermore, where decision aids were
implemented, few studies adequately reported their impact on psychological experiences such as
time pressure and information overload (Xia and Rao, 1999; Negnevitsky, 1996). This
equivocality is manifested in our limited understanding of how decision making is impacted by
psychological stress and the mitigating effect of decision aids (Kontogiannis, 1996).

3.0 AN INTEGRATED MODEL OF DECISION MAKING UNDER STRESS
Discussion in the previous section highlights the need to assimilate the disjointed but
potentially complementary pieces of research in DMUS support. In our proposed model, we aim
to integrate the two parts of previous research on DMUS – pre-conditions to stress, i.e. the stress
creators, and perceptions of stress i.e. the psychological manifestation of stress. Figure 1 presents
this integrative framework. The model presents factors that both create a stressful decision
situation and those that are experienced once the decision maker is involved in a stressful
situation.

7
Sprouts - http://sprouts.aisnet.org/9-55

The framework further proposes the intervening role of DSS on perceptions of stress.
Specifically, the use of DSS can potentially mitigate the negative psychological experiences
associated with stress and thereby improve decision quality. On the other hand, for certain
psychological factors, DSS may have the opposite effect – that of worsening the perception of
the stressor. The DMUS Framework in Figure 1 further suggests that DSS will have little effect
in mitigating pre-conditions to stress since these are defined by organizational and decision
environment. Consistent with all existing literature, any mitigation of psychological perceptions
will improve decision quality. In contrast, if the DSS has deleterious effects on psychological
perceptions of the decision maker, decision quality will be appropriately harmed.

Psychological
Perceptions of
stress

Pre-conditions
to stress
High Gain /
Loss
Risk

Time
Pressure
Uncertainty

Decision
Support
System

Complexity

Information
Overload

Organizational
Pressure

Dynamism

Decision
Quality

Figure 1. The DMUS Framework - Proposed model to characterize stressful decision situations,
decision quality, and the mitigating role of decision support systems.
The framework makes several suggestions, all of which can benefit from further research:
Proposition 1(a): Individuals who experience high gain or loss situations will
perceive greater stress manifested as dynamism and uncertainty as compared to
individuals who do not perceive such a risk.

Proposition 1(b): Individuals who perceive high gain or loss situations and use
DSS for decision making will experience lower levels of dynamism and
uncertainty as compared to individuals who do not use such a decision aid.
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Proposition 2(a): Individuals who perceive high risk in their decision
environment will perceive greater stress manifested as dynamism and uncertainty
as compared to individuals who do not perceive such a risk.

Proposition 2(b): Individuals who perceive high risk situations and use DSS for
decision making will perceive lower levels of dynamism and uncertainty as
compared to individuals who do not use such a decision aid.

Proposition 3(a): Individuals who perceive complexity in their decision
environment will perceive greater stress manifested as time pressure, information
overload, dynamism, and uncertainty as compared to individuals who do not
perceive such a risk.

Proposition 3(b): Individuals who percieve complexity in their decision
environment and use DSS for decision making will experience lower levels of
time pressure, information overload, dynamism, and uncertainty as compared to
individuals who do not use such a decision aid.

Proposition 4(a): Individuals who perceive organizational pressure in their
decision environment will perceive greater stress manifested as time pressure and
dynamism as compared to individuals who do not perceive such a risk.

Proposition 4(b): Individuals who perceive organizational pressure in their
decision environment and use DSS for decision making will experience lower
levels of time pressure and dynamism as compared to individuals who do not use
such a decision aid.
We examine some of these propositions in this paper.
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4.0 EXPERIMENTAL STUDY
To conduct a preliminary test of our model we executed a research study with 123
undergraduate business students enrolled in a business information systems course. Student
subjects have been widely used to study decision making and risk-taking situations (Valacich et
al., 2009). Valacich et al. (2009) pointed out that there are numerous studies comparing student
decision making with managers in real organizations indicating that “there are few differences in
the costs, erraticism, or patterns of biases in decisions made by these two groups” (p. 905). In
addition, student subjects are often preferable to practicing managers when studying decision
making due to organizational influences that are difficult to control.
The subjects in the study were divided into low and high stress groups based on the
treatment that was administered to them. The pre-conditions of stress proposed in the DMUS
framework were used to create conditions of high and low stress. A DSS was made available to
both the high and low stress groups. The decision task was to invest $50,000 in a portfolio of
stocks for a company with the intent of maximizing return. Motivating factors were incentives
of $10 gift certificates for food, at least one in each class, and a $100 grand prize for the overall
best decision.
Demographics of the subject group were fairly homogeneous. All subjects were enrolled
in a university in the same introductory business course with a common syllabus across all
sections, were in the 19-20 year old age group, had been admitted based on similar
characteristics such as grades and high SAT scores, and were in class sizes of about 25 students
each with four instructors with equivalent educations and experience. Four class sections were
taught by two different instructors so that each instructor had two different treatment scenarios,
one under stress and one not under stress. All subjects used a DSS as shown in Figure 2.
Participation was voluntary, and the experiment was held during class in a controlled computer
lab.

4.1 The Decision Task and Stress Conditions
Subjects were given the scenario of a first job in which they have $50,000 to invest in a
portfolio of stocks for their company. The decision problem was to choose a stock portfolio for
investing their funds to optimize value while minimizing risk. The portfolio consisted of 37
stocks divided into sectors as shown in Appendix 1 and drawn from actual historical data.
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Subjects were told to invest at least $10,000 in each of 3 different areas such as technology,
energy, etc. They did not have to invest all of the money and any remainder was left as cash
with no interest. Data were provided for the share price for each of the last 4 quarters, the
current share price (the purchase price), and the historical return rate. Subjects were informed
that:
Expected Return = (Avg. share price over 5 data points) * (# of shares
purchased) * (historic annual rate of return)
Instructions were presented in writing and verbally in the same manner in each class. Subjects
were provided opportunities through a follow-up Q&A session to obtain clarification on the task.
Risk was described as the variability of the share price, that is, the more variable the
stock price has been, and the more money put into it, the more risky the portfolio. On the other
hand, more risk usually translates into higher potential earnings. The decision question was
posed as: How should you invest up to $50,000 in a stock portfolio (3 different areas, at least
$10,000 per stock, do not have to invest all your money) so that you maximize your portfolio
value while minimizing your risk? Maule and Svenson (1993) define risky decisions as those
“characterized by coupling between alternatives and outcomes that are probabilistic and
therefore cannot be predicted with certainty” (p. 9), and this scenario is consistent with their
definition.
Following our proposed model in Figure 1, preconditions to stress were introduced.
High gain/loss was simulated using the $50,000 investment amount with potentially high return
or high loss. Risk was directly calculated as described later in section 4.2 and stocks with high
variability were included. Complexity was captured through the large number of stocks,
multiple constraints on investing, necessity of balancing return and risk, and lack of experience
on the part of the users. Organizational pressure was introduced by posting class competition
scores and giving one grand prize to the entire winning class. Individual scores were also posted
with the permission of each person to increase stress and all results were announced publicly as
was known ahead of time.
The treatment conditions varied stress in one of two experimental conditions. The
psychological manifestations of stress were time pressure, uncertainty, information overload, and
dynamism. Time was specifically manipulated. The large number of choices and complexity of
the decision provided an environment where we expected subjects to experience the other three
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stressors. In the low stress conditions subjects were given unlimited time to make their
decisions, and in the high stress conditions subjects were given 10 minutes. The variability in
the stock prices and large amount of information presented many possibilities, and subjects were
not able to investigate all scenarios within the allocated 10 minutes.
A DSS must be matched to the decision problem and to the decision maker (Howard,
1988). The DSS was written specifically for the experiment and consisted of an interface for
investment, drill-down into the stock past performance with tables and graphs, user input for
various portfolio choices, and output of the expected return and the associated risk. The
interface is shown in Figure 2. There is large variability possible with the design of the DSS, and
in order to remove the DSS as a variable in the study, we chose to vary stressors in the
experiment.

Figure 2. Screen print of the interface for the DSS.

4.2 The Decision Environment - Portfolio Risk, Return, and Optimization
Investors seek to maximize return on investments while maintaining an acceptable level
of risk. Risk and return are related, with higher return usually associated with higher risk. A
portion of the risk associated with an individual stock can be diversified away by balancing it
with less risky stocks for a given level of investment. The Expected Return on a portfolio was
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computed as the weighted average of the expected returns on the stocks that make up the
portfolio, with the weights reflecting the proportion of funds invested in each stock (Ballestero
and Pla-Santamaria, 2004). That is, for n stocks, i = 1 to n,

E[Rp] = ∑ wi E[Ri]
where E[Rp] is the expected return on the portfolio, n is the number of stocks in the portfolio, wi
is the proportion of funds invested in stock i, and E[Ri] is the expected return on stock i.
The variance (or standard deviation) of a portfolio reflects the variance (or standard
deviation) of the stocks that make up the portfolio as well as how they vary together, measured
as the covariance or correlation coefficient. Risk was calculated as the weighted average of the
variances of individual stocks, with the weight based on the amount of funds invested in each
stock in the portfolio. That is, for n stocks, i = 1 to n,
Risk = ∑ wi s
where E[Rp] is the expected return on the portfolio, n is the number of stocks in the portfolio, wi
is the proportion of funds invested in stock i, and E[Ri] is the expected return on stock i.
An optimal portfolio can be defined in one of two equivalent ways:
(1) For any level of volatility (or risk), select the portfolio that has the highest return.
(2) For any expected return, select the portfolio with the lowest volatility (or risk).
Either definition can be satisfied with a portfolio from the stock options called the efficient
frontier with the set of portfolios obtained from one definition the same as those from the other
definition. The efficient frontier for our stock options is shown in Figure 3.
The graph has the normal bullet nose shape, with the region in the center between the
branches being other portfolios that can be formed from the stock options. The top branch or
positively sloped portion of the graph is the efficient frontier. We defined the optimal portfolio
under the constraints in our experiment as the point at the top of the efficient frontier; that is, it is
the point at which we have maximum return for minimum risk.
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Figure 3. Efficient Frontier for portfolios in experiment.

4.3 Experimental Result
Subjects in each of the two experimental conditions reported portfolio selections under
our constraints and experimental conditions. A review of portfolio selection results (HSDSS=59,
LSDSS=64) resulted in the elimination of data from subjects who did not adhere to the
guidelines, i.e. invest at least $10,000 in each of 3 different areas any remainder left as cash with
no interest. This resulted in a final sample of n=53 for HSDSS cases and n=55 for LSDSS cases
for portfolio results. The mean return, standard deviation, and mean risk are reported in Table 1.
Table 1. Experimental Return and Risk of Portfolio Compared to Treatment Condition

Number
Subjects (n)

Mean
Return

Std. Dev.
Return

Mean
Risk
(Variance)

Std. Dev. of
Risk

HSDSS

53

$62258.39

$13374.95

3.720

8.943

LSDSS

55

$73918.71

$17409.49

2.201

2.759

Normality of the samples was checked using the Anderson-Darling goodness-of-fit test
statistic at a significance level of 0.05. This indicates whether a data sample comes from a
population with a specific distribution. It makes use of the specific distribution in calculating
critical values. Anderson-Darling is a one-sided test wherein the hypothesis that the distribution
is a particular form is rejected at the chosen significance level if the test statistic is greater than
the critical value for the normal distribution. The adjusted Anderson-Darling statistic is
multiplied by a constant that depends on the sample size (Trujillo-Ortiz, 2007). The results of

14
Sprouts - http://sprouts.aisnet.org/9-55

the Anderson-Darling test is shown in Table 2. As can be seen, none of the distributions are
normal, and therefore we could not use statistical tests assuming normality.
Table 2. Results of the Anderson-Darling test for the samples at alpha=0.050.

HSDSS
LSDSS

Sample size

AndersonDarling
statistic

53
55

3.4465
2.9846

AndersonDarling
adjusted
statistic
3.4980
3.0275

Probability
associated to
the AndersonDarling
statistic
0.0000
0.0000

Distribution

Not normal
Not normal

Next, we tested the hypothesis of equal medians for the two independent unequal-sized
samples using the Wilcoxon rank sum test with a significance level of 0.05. The test is used
when populations are not normal in place of the two sample t-test. The test consists of
combining the samples into one sample, sorting the result, assigning ranks to the sorted values,
and then finding the sum of the ranks. If the two populations have the same distribution then the
sum of the ranks in each sample should be close to the same value. Comparing the LSDSS case
with the HSDSS case, the Wilcoxon rank sum test yields p=2.8111e-004, and we reject the null
hypothesis that the medians are equal. We are 95% confident that the two samples are drawn
from different populations.

4.4 Psychological Responses
At the participant level, the outcome of a stressful situation can be driven by several
personality and environmental factors. Some that particularly concerned us were individual
ability to handle stress, prior experience in both task and use of technology for the task, and
differential perceptions of high gain or loss. Choosing subjects with similar backgrounds and
experiences minimized this difference in such experiences and abilities. Where an occasional
subject does demonstrate high experience in these areas, we expect that a statistically acceptable
sample size would mitigate the effects of such confounding factors. Possibly measures such as
those suggested by Pratt (1964) and inventories such as Coping Resources Inventory can be used
to measure risk aversion in future studies.
Each subject who participated in the experiment completed a questionnaire with a Likert
scale of 1 to 5 measuring their perception of time pressure, uncertainty, information overload and

15
Sprouts - http://sprouts.aisnet.org/9-55

dynamism. The specific statements posed to the subjects, means of the responses, and standard
deviations are shown in Table 3. The number of subjects in the sample reflect all those that
participated in the study, and the sample sizes are larger than those shown in Table 1 since
several portfolio results were eliminated as discussed previously.

Table 3. Reported psychological experiences in two experimental conditions.

HSDSS

LSDSS

n=59

n=64
Standard

Mean

Standard
Mean

Deviation

deviation

Time Pressure: The time assigned to this task was sufficient.
2.9153

1.1932

4.0161

1.1234

Uncertainty: It was clear what choice was best for me.
2.5254

1.0725

2.8413

1.0657

Information Overload: I felt overwhelmed with the amount of information provided to me for
this task.
2.1186

0.8727

1.7937

0.7220

Dynamism: I did not have to change my decisions again and again.
2.4237

0.9685

2.3651

1.0519

The Wilcoxon rank sum test for hypothesis of equal medians for two independent unequal-sized
samples at significance level of 0.05 was used to determine if the sample means are significantly
different. The results are shown in Table 4. We reject the null hypothesis that the medians of
the two groups are equal for time pressure and information overload. We do not reject the null
hypothesis for uncertainty and dynamism.
Table 4: Wilcoxon Test for Hypothesis of Equal Medians for Reported Psychological
Experiences

HSDSS
compared to
LSDSS

Time
Pressure
p=0.000
Reject

Uncertainty
p=0.1203
Do not reject
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Information
Overload
p=0.0269
Reject

Dynamism
p=0.5709
Do not reject

4.5 Discussion of Results
In terms of performance, the results are consistent with the literature. The Yerkes-Dodson
curve suggests that stress will decrease performance after some point, all else being equal, and
this effect is seen our experiment. We reject the null hypothesis of equal means in terms of
performance for the two groups. Since the LSDSS mean return is $73,918.71 with mean risk =
2.20 and the HSDSS mean return is $62,258.39 with mean risk = 3.720, we conclude that
subjects made better decisions under low stress conditions compared to high stress. The low
stress group has both a higher mean return and a lower risk that the higher stress group.
The psychological responses of the two groups are different for some variables. Since time
was specifically manipulated, we expected the high stress group to recognize time pressure, and
they did. The HSDSS group also reported a difference in their perception of information
overload compared to the LSDSS group, and this result was not expected since the DSS was
hypothesized to mitigate this response. The results indicate that there is no difference in the
reported psychological experiences under the two experimental conditions in terms of
uncertainty and dynamism. We suggest that this is support for the hypothesis that the DSS
mitigated the effect of stress in terms of these two variables.
5.0 IMPLICATIONS FOR RESEARCH
The results from our preliminary application of the DMUS framework indicate potential
for future research in this domain. First, this model may be further enhanced by examining other
pre-conditions and decision stressors. More specifically, we have not examined or attempted to
distinguish various features of the DSS to determine what aspect of the DSS has greater impact
on the psychological stressors. Researchers engaged in DSS design research may benefit from
keeping the pre-conditions and psychological factors constant while examining effectiveness of
specific DSS characteristics such as color and information presentation across experimental
groups.
Secondly, the evidence regarding effectiveness of DSS on decision quality has been
somewhat contradictory. For instance, Joslyn and Hunt (1998) focused on individual differences
of the decision maker in time-pressured situations and found that some people handle time
pressure better than others. This ability may result in better decision-making under stressful
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situations. As a result, the effectiveness of DSS may or may not be relevant in this case. Dora et
al. (2001) evaluated a decision support system for treatment of severe head injury patients by
comparing physician expert opinions with results generated by the decision support system. The
study concluded that the tool was not accurate enough to support complex decisions in highstress environments. Lerch and Harter (2001) found that providing certain types of cognitive
support for real-time dynamic decision making can degrade performance and designing systems
for such tasks is challenging. This contradictory evidence leads to the question – is there a
threshold beyond which DSS begin to lose their effectiveness in mitigating psychological
experiences? Yerkes and Dodson (1908) have proposed that there is an "inverted U" shaped
relationship between the levels of arousal or stress and the efficiency of memory (see Fig 4.). A
certain amount of arousal can be a motivator toward change (with change in this discussion
being learning). Too much or too little change will certainly work against the learner. Too little
arousal has an inert effect on the learner while too much has a hyperactive affect. Furthermore,
for each task optimal levels of arousal have to be discovered. This optimal level is (a) lower for
more difficult or intellectually (cognitive) tasks since learners need to concentrate on the
material, and (b) higher for tasks requiring endurance and persistence since learners need more
motivation. Subsequent research has confirmed that the correlation suggested by Yerkes and
Dodson exists (Broadhurst, 1959; Telegdy and Cohen 1971; Anderson, 1994; Dickman, 2002)
and many psychological and physiological factors have been developed to explain the
phenomenon. The Yerkes-Dodson Law can be extended to the use of DSS for stressful decision
making. If stimulation beyond an optimal level serves to degrade performance, how does the use
of DSS for supporting DMUS change the psychological experiences and stress at which a
decision maker operates? Based on this research, we make the following proposition:

Proposition 5: DSS will mitigate psychological effects of stress to a point beyond
which its effectiveness in such mitigation and, subsequently, decision quality will
decline.
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Figure 4: The Inverted ‘U’ Curve representing Yerkes-Dodson Law.
Adapted from Diamond (2005).
Finally, the above argument has interesting implications for both researchers who study
DSS design and those who study related decision making. For DSS designers, determining DSS
features that extend the point of decreasing returns will be a productive investment of time and
research efforts. For organizational behaviorists and psychologists, understanding and leveraging
individual factors that can result in better utilization of these DSS features will be worthwhile
direction to enhance our understanding of human decision making and information processing
abilities.
6.0 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
While prior research initiatives have provided deep understanding of particular aspects of
decision support technology and have explored specific benefits to decision making under time
pressure, we propose a broader framework that focuses on multiple gains from decision aids:
reduction of negative psychological experiences of time pressure, information overload,
uncertainty, and dynamism as well as improving decision quality. In this paper we explored the
effect of stress on decision making with a DSS. We hypothesized that using a DSS would
mitigate the reported psychological experiences under stress. Our experimental data only
partially support the model. We found support for mitigation of uncertainly and dynamism as
reported psychological experiences in high and low stress conditions with a DSS.
The contributions of this paper to the literature are:
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(1) providing a thorough review and synthesis of the literature on decision making under
stress as related to decision support systems;
(2) proposing an integrated model based on the literature that separates preconditions to
stress from psychological perceptions of stress;
(3) separating variables so that the potential mitigating role of decision support systems in
stressful decision making can be studied;
(4) characterizing the role of decision support systems in improving decision quality under
stress;
(5) providing experimental data to demonstrate that decision support systems can mitigate
some reported psychological experiences under stress.

Further research is needed to validate or refute the hypotheses and results of this study. Our data
are limited, and the stressful decision making is better studied in real environments. Based on
our study, however, we suggest that decision support systems could be specifically designed to
mitigate the negative effects of stress on human decision making in terms of the variables we
have identified, and that this is a fruitful area of future research.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The authors would like to thank the professors and students who participated in the experiment.
Dr. Faith Gilroy, emeritus professor of psychology at Loyola University Maryland, is
acknowledged for her helpful discussions and encouragement. This work was supported in part
by a grant from the Sellinger School of Business and Management at Loyola University
Maryland.

REFERENCES
Ahituv, N., Igbaria, M., and Sella, A. (1998). The effects of time pressure and completeness of
information on decision Making. Journal of Management Information System, 15 (2), 153172.
Akbari, S. and Menhaj, M.B. (2000). A new framework of a decision support system for air to air
combat tasks. Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, 3,
2019-2022.
Aminilari, M. and Pakath, R. (2005). Searching for information in a time pressured setting:
Experiences with a text-based and an image-based decision support system. Decision
Support Systems, 41(1), 37-68.

20
Sprouts - http://sprouts.aisnet.org/9-55

Anderson, K.J. (1994). Impulsivity, caffeine, and task-difficulty—A within-subjects test of the
Yerkes-Dodson Law. Personality and Individual Differences, 16(6), 813-829.
Angelborg-Thanderz, M. (1997). Military pilot performance - Dynamic decision making in its
extreme. In R. Flin, E. Salas, M. Strub, and L. Martin, (eds.), Decision Making Under
Stress: Emerging Themes and Applications, Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 225232.
Arnold, V., Hayne, S.C., Smith, C.A.P., and Sutton, S. (1998). An investigation of computer
support systems on managerial group decision making under time pressure. Advances in
Management Accounting, 6, 17-38.
Arnold, V., Sutton, S.G., Hayne, S.C., and Smith, C.A.P., (2000). Group decision making: The
impact of opportunity - Cost time pressure and group support systems. Behavioral
Research in Accounting, 12, 69-97.
Ballestero, E. and Pla-Santamaria, D. (2004). Selecting portfolios for mutual funds. Omega, 32,
385-394.
Baradell, J. and Klein, K. (1993). Relationship of life stress and body consciousness to
hypervigilant decision making. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 64(2), 267273.
Baumann, M.R., Sniezek, J.A. and Buerkle, C.A. (2001). Self evaluation stress, and performance:
A model of decision making under acute stress. In: E. Salas and G. Klein, (eds.), Linking
Expertise and Naturalistic Decision Making, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Mahwah, NJ,
(8), 139-159.
Benbasat, I., Dexter, A., and Todd, P. (1986). An experimental program investigating colorenhanced and graphical information presentation: An integration of the findings.
Communications of the ACM, 29 (11), 1094-105.
Broadhurst, P.L., (1959). A confirmation of the Yerkes-Dodson Rat. Acta Psychologica, 15, 603604.
Cannon-Bowers, J. and Salas, E. (2000). (eds.), Making decisions under stress: Implications for
individual and team training, American Psychological Association, November, Washington,
D.C.
Chewning, E.C. and Harrel, A.M. (1990). The effect of information load on decision makers’ cue
utilization levels and decision quality in a financial distress decision task. Accounting,
Organizations, and Society, 15 (6), 527-553.
Covey, S.R., Merrill, R.A. and Merrill, R.R. (1994) First Things First. New York, NY: Simon and
Schuster.
de Quervain, D.J.F., Roozendaal, B., Nitsch, R.M., McGaugh, J.L. and Hock, C. (2000). Acute
cortisone administration impairs retrieval of long-term declarative memory in healthy human
subjects. Nature Neuroscience, 3 (4), 313-314.
Diamond, D. (2005). Editorial: Cognitive, endocrine, and mechanistic perspectives on nonlinear relationships between arousal and brain function. Nonlinearity in Biology,
Toxicology, and Medicine, 3,1.
Dickman, S.J. (2002). Dimensions of arousal: Wakefulness and vigor. Human Factors, 44(3),
429.
Dora, C.S., Sarkar, M., Sundaresh, S., Harmanec, D., Yeo, T., Poh, K. and Leong, T. (2001).
Building decision support systems for treating severe head injuries. Proceedings of the
2001 IEEE International Conference on Systems, Man and Cybernetics, Tucson, AZ,
2952-2957.

21
Sprouts - http://sprouts.aisnet.org/9-55

Eisenhardt, K. (1989). Making fast strategic decisions in high-velocity environments. Academy of
Management Journal, 32 (3), 543-576.
Fiedler, F.E. (1986). The contribution of cognitive resources to leadership performance. In L.
Berkowitz, (ed.), Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, Academic Press, New
York, NY.
Field, J., Ritzman, L., Safizadeh, M. and Downing, C. (2006). Uncertainty reduction
approaches, uncertainty coping approaches, and process performance in financial services.
Decision Sciences, May 2006, 37 (2), 149-175.
Frisch, D. and Clemen, R. (1994). Beyond expected utility: Rethinking behavioral decision
research. Psychological Bulletin, 116 (1), 46-54.
Grabowski, M. and Sanborn, S. (2001). Evaluation of embedded intelligent real-time systems.
Decision Sciences, 32(1), 95-124.
Hahn, M., Lawson, R. and Lee, Y.G. (1992). The effect of time pressure and information load on
decision quality. Psychology & Marketing, 9 (5), 365-379.
Haubl, G. and Trifts, V. (2000). Consumer decision making in online shopping environments: The
effects of interactive decision aids. Marketing Science, 19 (1), 4-21.
Hey, J. (1993). Dynamic decision making under uncertainty: An experimental study of the
dynamic competitive firm. Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, 45 (1), 58-82.
Hey, J., Lotito, G., and Maffioletti, A. (2008). The Descriptive and Predictive Adequacy of
Theories of Decision Making Under Uncertainty/Ambiguity. Discussion Papers in
Economics, 2008/04, University of York, York, U.K.
Hollnagel, E. (1993), Human Reliability Analysis, Academic Press, London.
Hollnagel, E. (1987). Commentary: Issues in knowledge-based decision support. International
Journal of Man-Machine Studies, 27, 743-751.
Howard, R.A. (1988). Decision analysis: practice and promise. Management Science, 34 (6), 379–
395.
Hutchins, S. (1996). Principles for intelligent decision aiding. In C.A. Ntuen and E.H. Park (eds.).
Human Interaction with Complex Systems: Conceptual Principles and Design Practice,
Norwell, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 103-131.
Hutchins, S. and Duffy, L. (1993). Decision making evaluation facility for tactical teams. Naval
Command, Control and Ocean Surveillance Center, San Diego, CA 93-12102, May; Also
published Proceedings of the 9th Annual Conference on Command and Control Decision
Aids, June 1992, Section B-5.
Hwang, M. and Lin, J.W. (1999), Information dimension, information overload, and decision
quality. Journal of Information Science, 25 (3), 213-219.
Inzana, C.M., Driskell, J.E., Salas, E. and Johnston, J.H. (1996). Effect of preparatory information
on enhancing performance under stress. Journal of Applied Psychology, 81(4), 429-435.
Janis, I.L. (1993). Decision making under stress. In L. Goldberg and S. Breznitz, (eds.). Handbook
of Stress: Theoretical and Clinical Aspects (2nd ed.), Free Press, New York, NY, 69-88.
Jin,V. and Levis, A. (1990). Compensatory behavior in team decision making. Proceedings of the
5th IEEE International Symposium on Intelligent Control, Philadelphia, PA, 107-112.
Johnston, J., Driskell, J. and Salas, E. (1997). Vigilant and hyper vigilant decision making. Journal
of Applied Psychology, 82(4), 614-622.
Joslyn, S. and Hunt, E. (1998). Evaluating individual differences in response to time-pressure
situations. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 4(1), 16-43.

22
Sprouts - http://sprouts.aisnet.org/9-55

Kaemph, G.L., Klein, G.A., Thorsden, M.L. and Wolf, S. (1996). Decision making in complex
naval command and control environments. Human Factors, 38(2), 220-232.
Karau, S.J. and Kelly, J.R. (1992). The effects of time scarcity and time abundance on group
performance quality and interaction process. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology,
28(6), 523-541.
Keinan, G. (1987). Decision making under stress: Scanning of alternatives under controllable and
uncontrollable threats. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 52(3), 639-644.
Kelly, J.R. and McGrath, J.R. (1985). Effects of time limits and task types on task performance
and interaction of four-person groups. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
49(2), 395-407.
Kersthot, J. (1994). The effect of time pressure on decision-making behavior in a dynamic task
environment. Acta Psychologica, 86, 89-104.
Kim, S.L. (1998). Measuring the impact on work performance of collaborative engineering teams.
American Society for Information Science (ASIS) Midyear proceedings. May, 17-20.
Orlando, FL.
Kirby, S. and Davis, M. (1998). A study of escalating commitment in principal-agent relationships:
Effects of monitoring and personal responsibility. Journal of Applied Psychology, 83(2), 206217.
Klein, G. (1989). Recognition-primed decisions. In W. Rouse (ed.), Advances in Man-Machine
System Research, Vol. 5, Greenwich, CT, JAI Press, 47-92.
Klein, G., Orasanu, J., Calderwood, R. and Zsambok, C. (eds.) (1993). Decision Making in Action:
Models and Methods, Norwood, NJ: Ablex.
Kontogiannis, T. (1996). Stress and operator decision making in coping with emergencies.
International Journal of Human-Computer Studies, 45 (1), 75-104.
Kowalski, K. (1995). A human component to consider in your emergency management plans: The
critical incidence stress factor. Safety Science, 20, 115-123.
Kowalski-Trakofler, K., Vaught, C. and Scharf, T. (2003). Judgment and decision making under
stress: An overview for emergency managers. International Journal of Emergency
Management, 1(3), 278-289.
Lamb, M. (1991). Attention in humans and animals: Is there a capacity limitation at the time of
encoding? Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Behavior Processes, 17 (1), 45-54.
Landsbergen, D., Coursey, D.H., Loveless, S. and Shangraw, R.F. (1997). Decision quality,
confidence, and commitment with expert systems: An experimental study. Journal of Public
Administration Research and Theory, 7 (1), 131-158.
Lee, W.P. (2004). Applying domain knowledge and social information to product analysis and
recommendations: An agent-based decision support system. Expert Systems, 21 (3), 138148.
Lehner, P., Seyed-Solorforough, M.M., O'Connor, M.F., Sak, S. and Mullin, T. (1997). Cognitive
biases and time stress in team decision making. IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man &
Cybernetics, Part A (Systems & Humans), 27 (5), 698-703.
Lerch, F.J. and Harter, D.E. (2001). Cognitive support for real-time dynamic decision-making.
Information Systems Research, 12 (1), 63-82.
Mahan, R.P, Marino, C.J., Elliott, L., Haarbauer, E. and Dunwoody, P. (1999). Countermeasures
against stress: Dynamic cognitive induction. Proceedings of 8th International Conference on
Human-Computer Interaction, 691-695.

23
Sprouts - http://sprouts.aisnet.org/9-55

Mann, L. and Tan, C. (1993). The hassled decision maker: The effects of perceived time pressure
on information processing in decision making. Australian Journal of Management, 18(2),
197-209.
Marsden, J., Pakath, R. and Wibowo, K. (2002). Decision making under time pressure with
different information sources and performance-based financial incentives. Decision Support
Systems, 34 (1), 75-97.
Maule, A.J. and Svenson, O. (Eds.) (1993). Time Pressure and Stress in Human Judgment and
Decision Making, Springer, New York, NY.
Maule, A., Hockey, G. and Bdzola, L. (2000). Effects of time pressure on decision-making under
uncertainty: Changes in affective state and information processing strategy. Acta
Psychologica, 104(3), 283-301.
Metha, A., Webb, L. and Bitter, G. (1995). A problem-solving / decision-making multimedia
project for suicide prevention. Proceedings of World Conference on Educational Multimedia
and Hypermedia, Graz, Austria, 472-475.
Morrison, J.G., Kelly, R., Moore, R. and Hutchins, S. (1997). Tactical Decision Making Under
Stress (TADMUS) - Decision Support System. 1997 IRIS National Symposium on Sensor
and Data Fusion, MIT Lincoln Laboratory, Lexington, MA, 14-17 April.
Negnevitsky, M. (1996). Crisis management in power systems: A knowledge based approach
Proceedings of the Applications of Artificial Intelligence in Engineering XI Conference,
Southampton, UK, CD-ROM, 17.
Nutt, P.C. (1990). Making tough decisions: Tactics for improving managerial decision-making.
San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass Publishers.
Papamichail, K.N. and French, S. (2005). Design and evaluation of an intelligent decision support
system for nuclear emergencies. Decision Support Systems, 41(1), 84-111.
Phillips-Wren, G. and Forgionne, G. (2002). Advanced decision making support using intelligent
agent technology. Journal of Decision Systems, 11(2), 165-184.
Pomerol, J.C. (2001). Scenario development and practical decision making under uncertainty.
Decision Support Systems, 31, 197-204.
Pomerol, J.C. and Brezillon, P. (1997). Organizational experiences with multicriteria decision
support systems: Problems and issues. Proceedings of the Thirtieth Hawaii International
Conference on System Sciences, 320-327.
Poulton, E.C. (1976). Arousing environmental stresses can improve performance whatever people
say. Aviation, Space, and Environmental Medicine, 47,1193-1204.
Pratt, J. (1964). Risk Aversion in the Small and in the Large. Econometrica, 32, 122-136.
Sarter, N.B. and Schroeder, B. (2001). Supporting decision making and action selection under time
pressure and uncertainty: The case of in-flight icing. Human Factors, 43(4), 573-574.
Schultze, U. and Vandenbosch, B. (1998). Information overload in a groupware environment: Now
you see it now you don’t. Journal of Organizational Computing and Electronic Commerce, 8
(2), 127-148.
Simon, H. A. (1980). The new science of management decision In: R. Cyert and L. Welsch (eds.),
Management Decision-making, New York, NY: Penguin Books.
Simon, H. (1997). Models of Bounded Rationality - Vol. 3, New York, NY: MIT Press.
Smith, C.A.P, Arnold, V. and Sutton, S.G. (1997). The impact of time pressure on decision
making for choice and judgment tasks: Implications for audit planning. Accounting and
Business Review, July, 365-383.

24
Sprouts - http://sprouts.aisnet.org/9-55

Smith, C.A.P., Johnston, J., and Paris, C. (2004). Decision support for air warfare: Detection of
deceptive threats. Group Decision and Negotiation, 13(2), 129-148.
Stokes, A. and Raby, M. (1989). Stress and cognitive performance in trainee pilots. Proceedings of
the Human Factors Society 33rd Annual Meeting, Denver, CO, 883-887.
Sutton, S., Smith, C.A.P., Arnold, V. and Hayne, S. (1998). Audit group decision-making: The
impact of time pressure and group support systems. AUDIT: The Audit Automation
Magazine, 12.
Svenson, O. and Edland, A. (1987). Change of preferences under time pressure: Choices and
judgments. Scandinavian Journal of Psychology, 29(4), 322-330.
Svenson, O., Edland, A. and Karlsson, G. (1985). The effect of numerical and verbal information
and time stress on judgments of the attractiveness of decision alternatives. In L.B. Methlie,
R.H. Sprague Jr. (eds.). Knowledge Representation for Decision Support Systems,
Proceedings of the IFIP WG 8.3 Working Conference, Amsterdam, Netherlands, 133-144.
Telegdy, G.A., Cohen, J.S. (1971). Cue utilization and drive level in albino rat. Journal of
Comparative and Physiological Psychology, 75(2), 248-253.
Thorsden, M. (1998). Display for navy landing signal officers: Supporting decision making under
extreme time pressure. Americas Conference on Information Systems, Baltimore, MD, 255256.
Turtekan, O. and Sharda, R. (2004). Development of fisheye-based information search processing
aid (FISPA) for managing information overload in the web environment. Decision Support
Systems, 37(3), 415-434.
Tversky, A. and Kahneman, D. (1974). Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases.
Science, 185, 1124-1131.
Valacich, J., Sarker, S., Pratt, J., and Groomer, M. (2009). Understanding risk-taking behavior of
groups: a 'decision analysis' perspective. Decision Support Systems, March 2009, 46 (4),
902-912.
Vecchio, R. (1990). Theoretical and empirical examination of cognitive resource theory. Journal
of Applied Psychology, 75 (2), 141-147.
Vila, J. and Beccue, B. (1995). Effect of visualization on the decision maker when using analytic
hierarchy process. Proceedings of the 20th Hawaii Conference on System Sciences, HI, 9921001.
Vugdelija, J. and Aguirre, J. (2004). Flood warning [power plant information overload]. Modern
Power Systems, 24(9), 25-30.
Wild, R.H. and Griggs, K.A. (1998). Could a volumetric display enhance decision making under
stress? Americas Conference on Information Systems, Baltimore, MD, 257-258.
Wright, P. (1974). The harassed decision maker: Time pressures, distractions, and the use of
evidence. Journal of Applied Psychology, 59(5), 555-561.
Xia, Q. and Rao, M. (1999). Knowledge architecture and system design for intelligent operation
support systems. Expert Systems with Applications, 17 (2), 555-561.
Yerkes, R.M. and Dodson, J.D. (1908). The relation of strength of stimulus to rapidity of habitformation. Journal of Comparative Neurology and Psychology, 18, 459-482.
Zeleznikow, J. and Nolan, J. (2001). Using soft computing to build real world intelligent decision
support systems in uncertain domains. Decision Support Systems, 31, 263-285.

25
Sprouts - http://sprouts.aisnet.org/9-55

APPENDIX 1 Stock choices for the portfolio.

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37

Company Name
Intel
Dell
MSFT
Toshiba
Compaq
Gas Inc.
BP
Nuclear Inc
Exxon
Mobile
Hydro Inc.
Citgo
Chevron
Ford
Saturn
Toyota
Honda
Isuzu
Mercedes
Aflac
Nationwide
Verizon
Tmobile
ATT
Cingular
MCI
GRU
FLPowerLt
Banana Rep
Ann Taylor
Sears
Gap
Old Navy
Ross
Burdines
JC Penny
Dillards

Category
Tech
Tech
Tech
Tech
Tech
Energy
Energy
Energy
Energy
Energy
Energy
Energy
Energy
Auto
Auto
Auto
Auto
Auto
Auto
Insurance
Insurance
Communication
Communication
Communication
Communication
Communication
Utilities
Utilities
Retail
Retail
Retail
Retail
Retail
Retail
Retail
Retail
Retail
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